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PAPER NO. 1 
Some Social Expectations of Christians in Yugoslavia 
with Primary Emphasis on the Protestant Churches 
by N. Gerald Shenk 
N. Gerald Shenk received his B. A. degree from 
Eastern Mennonite College in Virginia and his 
M. A. in theology from Fuller Theological Sem­
inary in California. He is currently studying 
philosophy and sociology at the Universities of 
Zagreb and Sarajevo in Yugoslavia. He has been 
residing in Yugoslavia since 1977, sponsored by 
the Mennonite Church. This paper was written 
f9r a conference on the Radical Reformation and 
Marxist Critiques of Constantinian Christendom 
with special reference to Eastern Europe, held 
in Elkhart, IN, in November, 1980. In a slightly 
revised version it was published in The Mennon­
ite Quarterly Review, Vol. 55 (July, 1981), · 
pp. 23 1-239, under the title, "Social Expecta­
tions of Christians in a Marxist State." It is 
presented here with the permission of the editors 
and the author. 
Yugoslavia is one of many Marxist states, and not exactly typical, but its 
complexity (with six main nationalities, numerous languages, two distinct alpha­
bets, etc. ) can be creative and instructive. The history of cultural, political 
and religious tensions has required a deliberate policy of the state toward or­
�.anized religious affirs in the new socialist order since 1945. This sphere of 
Eocial reality has become the subject of reflection and serious academic inves­
tigation, especially since the mid-1960s, when the first doctoral degrees in 
f;ociology of religion began to be awarded in Yugoslav universities. 
Here is an outline of the primary aspects of the religious inheritance, some 
effects of socialist experience.on religious communities, the contemporary concept 
of the religious sphere, developments in the basic attitudes between church and 
state, and recent speculation about prospects for the relationship between reli­
gious communities and the state, based on social expectations between them. 
The complexity of the religious inheritance in Yugoslavia is far older than 
the struggle against occupation by Hitler's Germany and its allies in 1941. 
Ancient cultural differences between East and West, Greece and Rome, antedate 
even the arrival of the Slavic tribes in these southern reaches of their migra­
tions during the seventh century A. D. But religious variations soon carne to 
provide the symbolism for ethnic differences which fostered and eventually exac­
erbated an ongoing tension among these several peoples. 
In its positive aspects, the religious legacy is widely recognized as in­
cluding priceless contributions in culture, education, literacy, art, a�chitec-
2 
ture and the development of values, as well as handling functions of th·� passages 
of life and the moral instruction of the populace. The continuity and development 
of European civilization are rightfully attributed to the care taken by religious 
institutions through the centuries. 
Yet while the cultural indebtedness to the preservers of tradition is ack­
nowledged, the moral bankruptcy of religious practice had come to a climax·just 
prior to and during the struggle for national liberation during World War II. The 
worst fruits of Constantinian Christendom in this situation were the marriage of 
religious allegiance to the most rabid forms of nationalism, and the tragic rec�rd 
of forced conversions, especially during moments of political opportunity when one 
religious community sought to gain the advantage over others. The forces of revo­
Jutionary change could only regard the church system as one more bureaucracy, a 
tax burden, an insatiable land holder, demanding the right to dictate both public 
and private morality, reserving to itself the privilege of advising courts and 
legislature in its own interest, exemptions for its functionaries from public du­
ties such as military. At the slightest encroachment against these interests, the 
established churches did not hesitate to lobby, pressure and threaten dire sanc­
tions against decision-�akers who failed to toe the line •. And in the rare event 
that these measures were insufficient, the religious establishment could and all 
too frequently did resort to stirring up latent nationalist intolerance of others 
jn the political union to a frenzy of fanaticism and even fratricide. The most 
1ecent tragic examples are no more antiquated than World War II, when Serbs, Croats, 
�lovenes, Muslims, Jews and gypsies all perished in atrocitie� condoned and some­
times even led by religious officials. Such abuses met with genuine popular rejec­
tion, and the fate of the religious establishments after the war was justly linked 
t o  the demand for retribution against particular segments of the hierarchies, 
t hose individuals whose compromises had been most obvious and flagrant. l 
What method of sociological investigation could demonstrate the effects on 
religious life of some thirty years' experience with the Yugoslav experiment in 
self-management socialism? This work has yet to be done, and the observations which 
follow can only be tentative and speculative in character. 
First it must be noted that after centuries of complicity between religion and 
society, this is the first deliberately secular state in Yugoslav experience,· one 
1 For a cautious but intriguing account of one such process see Stella 
Alexander, "The Trial of Archbishop Stepinac," Church and State in Yugoslavia 
since 1945 (Cambridge, 1979), 95- 120. 
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in which no single religious community dominates public affairs at the expense of 
other groups. 
For Baptist, Pentecostal, Methodist, Adventist and other small groups ("sects, " 
in sociological terminology, though the term is avoided in public discourse in 
Yugoslavia today because of its pejorative theological overtones), 2 this meant a 
usdden new constitutional equality before the law, a dramatic improvement over 
their situation in "old Yugoslavia, " the monarchy between World Wars I & II, when 
zealous priests could burn,down the meetinghouses of such "heretics" with impunity 
and even with the complicity of the legal authorities in the old Constantinian order. 
The new socialist order set itself vigorously to the. disestablishment of reli­
gion. This had substantial economic consequences, proportional to the privileged 
economic role that the established churches (specifically the Orthodox and Catholic 
Churches) had enjoyed in the earlier arrangement. In the development of church-state 
relations (see below), this first period was accordingly fraught with a great deal 
of tension and frustration on the part of suddenly "impoverished" church leaders. 
But land reform itself was not a ne:w idea. Even in "old Yugoslavia" such measures 
had proceeded with popular support, but the religious land holdings alone had re­
mained exempt from agrarian reform, leaving the church as the last of the huge 
feudal land h9lders. Now church estates also were carved up by reform. 
Many church facilities have in fact been returned to religious use in the 
meantime, but those possessions that had served solely as income producers for 
economic security have remained in the service of the broader community. In retro­
spect, even some people in church circles admit that these measures, difficult 
though their impact was at first, have in fact served to liberate the church from 
some involvements that had made it a burden to society, rather than a servant. 
Given the reluctance of the large traditional religious-communities to dis­
sociate themselves from identification with nationalism (that is, the ethnocentric 
fervor which fans existing tensions into conflagrations during times of social 
upheaval), the broader society has taken upon itself the task of policing inter­
religious tensions. A sad history here is gradually being overcome, with consider­
able support for efforts to build positive relationships among the different 
religious communities. 
With the restructuring of the relationship between church and state has come 
a much sharper definition of what is religious and what is not. This is in part a 
2 This distinction made explicit for example, by the leading sociologist 
Vuko Pavic'evi�, Sociologija religije (Beograd: Bigz, 1980 2), 329-330. 
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natural consequence of general secularization in modern Europe, but it is also a 
matter for specific legislation--for example, regulating the types of activity 
which constitute proper religious rituals at the graveside. 3 One apologist has 
described the developments of such policies under the caption, "The Abuse of 
Religion Limits Freedom of Religious Confession.114 
This adjustment to changed conditions has not been painless for the tradi­
tional religious communities, but some people have seen in this process a · purifi­
cation. of the church 1 s involvement in the world, particularly where that involve­
ment had been quite compromised in establishment Christendom. 
At the interface with broader society, then, the proper sphere of religious 
activity is regarded as consisting of public gatherings·, open and announced, in 
facilities which conform to ordinc::ry building and zoning regulations; religious 
instruction for all who voluntari�.y seek it; training for religious leaders in 
educational facilities; religious publication; and the traditional rites of pas­
sage (at birth, marriage, death), providing religious rituals for all who continue 
to seek these services. 
In some spheres of social activity· society has had such negative experience 
with religious involvement that it has clearly rejected those ministrations; they 
are now by definition beyond the pale of appropriate religious activity. These 
include the self-appointed role as conscience to society and pontification on 
public policies in the arts, culture, education and public morality. Particularly 
anathematized are any and all cases where organized religion is abused as a cover 
for political opposition to the existing social order. 
Furthermore, no role at all is seen for the church as an institution to 
mediate even for its own adherents in their obligations and r.espon�ibilities to 
�he wider society. Believers must participate in political affairs as citizens, 
:1ot first as members of a special subgroup in society. Nor can believers delegate 
:heir political responsibilities to their religious leaders, who would then because 
of their position in the religious hierarchy seek out parallel recognition and 
duties in public affairs. The church, then, is not a recognized lobby in the busi­
ness of the wider society. No religious leader holds office by virtue of ecclesias-
tic prerogative. 
Neither may the church curry public favor through competition by establishing 
alternatives to public systems of social welfare. Hospitals, orphanages and schools 
are public ·enterprises, not religious. 
3 The Law on Funeral Activities is designed to prevent priests from misappro­
priating the situation with propaganda at the expense of a captive audience--the · 
unbelievin� relatives� that is. See Ivan Cvitkovi�, Bilje�ke o Religiji (Sarajevo: OslobodjenJe, 1980), a7. 
4 Ibid�, 109-113. 
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While the full range of religious attitudes toward the state has found ex­
pression at various.times and circumstances, several writers have noted a distinct 
pattern of progression in the basic attitude of the major churches toward the 
state, during the post-war period: (1) The socialist system is treated as an evil 
which must be continuously attacked. (2) The system is reg.arded as acceptable, 
on condition that it adjust its relationship with the churches, in favor of the 
interests of the churches. (3) The system is regarded with express tolerance and 
loyalty. (4) The system is given open verbal support. (5) The system is given 
open practical support, manifest in action.5 
The all-encompassing nature of the world views at stake in these relations 
engenders much emotion and sometimes friction. Strong interests.on both (or sev­
eral) sides do upon o ccasion come into direct conflict, even within the framework 
of loyalty to the task of building socialism. At the practical level, some points 
of contact and tension include influence on the youth; relative level of atten­
dance at party versus church functions (especially in the villages, where such 
comparisons are most obvious); control of the means of communication; and the 
ideological direction of education. At the local level, actual practice of polit-
ical authorit·ies and church functionaries in fact varies widely. Where the Con­
stantinian tradition of jockeying for power persists between them, anomalies and 
abuses have occurred on both sides. But where cooperation is the basic mode, 
patience has accomplished a modus vivendi which has shown marked improvement. 
To draw the contrast to its sharpest, we can outline two basic clusters of 
values. The elementary themes which form the backbone of socialist morality are 
recited in every context, built into a new consciousness of unity, brotherhood, 
loyalty, diligene'e, self-defence, resourcefulne-ss and intergroup tolerance. Long 
after the short-lived sway of "socialist realism" in the arts, this deliberate 
value-orientation does appear in school curricula, popular media, and even in 
entertainment. 
Yet the unholy mixture of religion and power, on the other hand, is remem­
bered as the direct counter-example--of disintegration, fratricide, treachery, 
indolence, engendering dependence, reliance on professional hierarchy, and perhaps 
as a sectarian brotherhood always much narrower than society itself, and thus a 
commonality at the expense of other subgroups. 
There is a new recognition that religious activity when purged of power and 
nationalfsm may eventually have a positive contribution to make in the context of 
5 Esad Cimic, Socijalisticko drustvo i religija (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 19702), 21. 
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1 more fully self-managed socialist society. But in the meantime the philosophers 
,Jf religion are admitting that some individuals (alienated and neurotic) have 
1eeds which continue to be met by the mystery and ritual of the religious tradi­
:ions, as a private but not a social phenomenon. 
Until recently, this view of religion as a necessary hangover from earlier 
::ocieties has been predominant. With cautious and discreet supervision, such . 
. 1ctivities could be prevented frotl!- reverting to previ.ous, less cooperative forms. 
If experience in other socialist countries be taken as a guide, there would even 
be a slight probability that the religious communities might again thoroughly 
align themselves with their society as to become in a new way its handmaidens. 
The social scope of traditional religion truly has been diminished, however, 
in recent decades. In recent social research, neither theism nor atheism but 
religious·indifference is the broadest category among young people. And there is 
little evidence available to indicate that traditional religion is being trans­
formed into the new liberated humanist, anti-authoritarian forms which might one 
day overcome alienation and neuroses on the lines of Erich Fromm's speculation, 
for example. One Yugoslav sociologist comments that such a development would 
signify a radical historical and cultural discontinuity, a unique form of transcen­
dence which will bear little resemblance to its former cousins (present and past 
expressions).6 
Like the other members of modern Yugos l.av society, Christians look to the 
society for the full range of essential services: health facilities, education, 
employment, economic security, social planning, etc. The church is not and can­
not be regarded as an alternative to any of these. Beyond this, there are the 
symbols and meaning systems for an identity broader than the parochial ethnic or 
confessional ones of the past, a world view and explanation which provide links 
�ith structures beyond the Yugoslav context, notably in the non-aligned movement 
rnd the Third World. 
Yugoslav society has found it in its own interest to develop a ture sensi­
tivity to the ramifications of public policies for religious communities, estab­
] ishing commissions and institutes, though not an actual dialogue, in ·the field 
<f religious research. These studies are closely attended only by Catholic scholars 
thus far in the religious communities. Curiously enough, it seems that for all 
the ubiquity of Marxist teaching, Christians, especially Orthodox and Protestants, 
have invested far less energy in the study of society around them than the Marxists 
have put into the study of religious behavior and commitment. 
6 Es ad Cimic, interviewed in "Pitanja " (Zagreb: Rkssoh, 1980j Numbers 4 and 5), 29. 
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It is instructive to note which indicators the social scientists identify in 
studying belief and intensity of participation. In a region predominantly Catholic, 
these researchers selected the following as fundamentals of the faith for ''erifi­
cation: belief about God, Jesus Christ, miracles, origin of  moral norms, origin of 
the earth, origin of  man, concepts of life after death. But reports about items of 
belief are not in themselves adequate measures of religious commitment. Thus, 
participation in religious activities is also surveyed. Prayer at home, cele­
bration of  religious holidays, wearing religious symbols, baptism, attenJance at 
religious instruction and reading religious publications are of primary interest 
here. 
It is not possible on this occasion to cite nor to evaluate the broad range 
of  literature related to the question of whether religion is withering. away. As 
far as public policy is concerned, it was recognized almost from the outset that 
the withering away of religion is a process which cannot be forced. Administrative 
measures of  harassment directed against believers very easily backfire and prove 
counterproductive. Instead of  weakening the religious community, direct opposition 
by the state tends to strengthen it. 11The threat to religious freedoms always 
strengthens the need for religious experiences.117 
Not unusual is the lament of  a young parish priest: 11As soon as people stop 
dying for the faith, it starts dying out. 11 Accordingly, the authorities have 
consistently frustrated the natural (?) religious desire for martyr-heroes. Quite 
delicate treatment has been accorded even the most cantanke·rous of  religious 
critics. 8 
The questiort of  the future of  religion in socialist conditions is often treated 
with much wishful thinking and dogmatic declaration by both religious and political 
officials. Less heat and more light is to be found in the work of some social 
scientists, who demonstrate an awareness of the dynamic process.of secularization 
and 11atheization,11 the consequent 11worldly religion11 and secular idolatries which 
characterize the consumer society. The need for transcendence has not escaped their 
attention, and some are asserting that precisely due to this element, traditional 
religion is in fact richer in human experience and depth of  meaning than the newer, 
manipulative secular religions. This, however, is not a claim that transcendence in 
the future must be religious. 
7 Es ad 6 imic, Soc. d ruhvo, 2 1. 
8 Alexander, 174- 177,on the case of the Orthodox Vicar-Bishop Varnava, a pro­
fessed pacifist. 
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Do Protestant p·1ety or nonestablished free-church groups have a role to play 
in these development! and transitions within socialist yugoslavia? One form of 
Christianity seems roughly to fit both the pietist tradition and the Marxist toler­
ance of religious activity. It is chara cterized by a quiet, nonspectacular system 
which fosters devotion, obedience and a personal faith, one which does not force 
itself aggressively tpon society or neighbors, contents itself with an otherworldly 
hope, little concrneci with its own social reality in this fallen world. 
3uch a formula has been selected by many sectarian groups. Having begun 
perha,JS as small-seal� social movements in times of social unrest, they have for 
the m<>St part been rejuced to a holding operation of self-maintenance, on a diet 
of minor prophets and apocalypse. 
From the standpoint of Marxist philosophy, it must be admitted that th�s 
aarro'v expression of Christianity. will never threaten the critical conclusion that 
·religion is for weaklings, cowards and psychological basket cases. Nor will it 
�ver atone positively for the tragic history bequeathed by Christendom in these 
lands. Nor in its passive disengagement and tame withdrawal will such Christianity 
l!Ver add its unique note of metanoia and shalom to the cacophony of secular values 
around it. But there remains a question of more than speculative significance, 
whether the current societal tolerance for religious activity is much broader than 
the earlier much criticized function of religion as an opiate of the people. In 
other words, if it keeps the people contented, such religion is no more dangerous 
to society than soccer, for example. 
And from the standpoint of New Testament faith or a radical Anabaptist critique 
of Christendom, this heritage of pious terminology and spiritual allegory will 
never measure up to the fullness of Christ either. The obvious result is little 
n >re than a collection of pious individuals, whose whole interaction is directed 
to fostering and preserving private relationships with a distant God Almighty, 
nediated by a carpenter's son turned sweet shepherd of wandering sheep. 
This evaluation must not be understood as a negation of true brothers and 
sisters in the faith, nor as a denial of the reservoir of truth mysticially 
£mbodied in these quiet small communities. The incarnation of that truth as a 
present and social reality in this socialist context must be the greatest task 
�hich believers can set for themselves with the full range of freedom and responsi­
bility available to them now. 
One Yugoslav the?logian evaluated the general situation of believers in 
socialist Europe along these lines: 
Evangelical Christians in Eastern Europe are marked by a theology of 
the cross. They are not adherents of popular religion offering ready­
made answers to the problems of their existence. Their Christian life 
has a depth of commitment and spirit of sacrifice going far beyond 
anything known as a response to the "cheap grace" or "prosperity gos­
pel" popular in some segments of Western evangelicalism • • •  High 
morals and exemplary living are the strongest testimony evangelicals 
in Eastern Europe present within their societies • . •  Evangelical 
churches encourage their members to be loyal citizens and diligent 
workers. They know that the new social order and the high ideals of· 
their society need the support of the "new man" whom only Christ can 
create. There is no fear for the future of the Church of Jesus Christ; 
its future does not depend upon the good will of worldly authorities 
and attitudes of temporaly powers, but upon the sovereign Lord of 
History, the only Redeemer of mankind to whom they have pledged their 
allegiance.9 
9 
But this assessment is made with a realis�ic view of the problems and weakness faced 
by believers as well: 
Lack of systematical theological training, coupled with external cir­
cumstances, often leads to an escapist eschatology that in turn justi­
fies the Marxist accusation of alienation. Evangelical faith is often 
considered reactionary and is suspect as a remnant of the.old order or 
an infiltration of Western influence. Unfortunately, religious acti­
vism in some East European countries is considered synonymous with 
political dissidence. Evident also in many places is a generation gap 
between bolder Christians with their forms of inner piety, lack of 
concern for larger social and human issues, and traditional ways 
of worship coupled with legalism as the norm of Christian life, and 
the more enthusiastic and better educated young people who are 
attracted to a more lively, innovative and reflective presentation of 
the Gospel. The evangelical establishment is more or less marked by 
a retreat from the world, forcing them into the position of only a 
tolerated and irrelevant minority,lO 
Two further weaknesses hamper the rise of authentic Christianity in these small 
circles, both imported like the theology from the West: 1) The pursuit of material 
well-being. There may be a connection here both with Wesley's lament about the 
"continual decline of pure religion" and with Marx'� famed thesis on the withering 
away of religion when economic and social conditions of alienation are superseded. 
2) Apathy, or spiritual indifference. As noted above, this phenomenon is on the 
�ncrease. It may also have roots in the Constantinian tradition where society 
holds full responsibility for material and social order, while the religious pro­
fessionals mediate all functions on the spiritual front. The traditions of lay 
activism, voluntarism and parachurch fervor so essential to North American Chris­
tendom have never taken root in Yugoslav soil. 
9 Peter Kuzmit, "Evangelical Witness in Eastern Europe," Serving O�r Generation: 
Evangelical Strategies for the Eighties (Colorado Springs: World Evangelical Fellow­
ship, 1980), 8 1. 
10 Ibid. , 82-83. 
The import of the preceding analysis of religious reality in Yugoslav 
conditions may best be outlined with a series of concluding theses: 
(1) Contemporary public policies toward religious communities may only be 
1mderstood in the context of past abuses of religious privilege in conditions 
of established Christendom. 
(2) True Christianity need not fear the piercing Marxist critique of that 
religious legacy, but instead has much to learn about the attitudes and engage­
ments of authentic faith by studying its own social reality with as much 
diligence as the social scientists show in researching religious commitment. 
(3) Trimmed of its temporal power functions, disestablished Christianity 
''ill not avail itself of methods which depend on institutions in direct com­
petition with the programs of broader society (alternative hospitals, etc.). 
(4) Both New Testament and Anabaptist expressions of the faith had more in 
<ommon with these (worldly) powerless conditions than our own quite triumphal 
c:.nd established North American Christendom. 
(5) Does the spread of our· faith depend on fair weather at home and foul 
v.reather abroad? Some evangelism smacks of a power dynamic where the comfortable 
invite the weak to buy into a vision conditioned by sectarian greenhouses. 
(6) Neither in.our own society nor in others does authentic Christianity 
have a vested interest in the persistence of alienating conditions which foster 
an opiate religion of escape. 
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(7) Not the re-establishment of Christendom, but a deliberately secular 
society lends itself best to fostering responsible involvement by Christians in 
the needs and possibilities of the social reality where thE!Y are planted. Their 
faith must not be privatized nor ?rganized into alternative and competing power 
structures, but must demonstrate a corporate reality of caring personalism avail­
able to and in the service of others in the broader society. 
